

18 June 1946
CSG 6-04

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

PROVISION FOR THE
COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
BY CLANDESTINE METHODS

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the unanimous concurrence of the
Intelligence Advisory Board

1. During the war, the collection of foreign intelligence information by clandestine methods was accomplished by a number of agencies with varying degrees of success in production and in maintenance of security. In the continuing emergency, some of these agencies still exist and are functioning in whole or in part. Some of the wartime agencies which operated in this field have been curtailed or disbanded; some are expanding their efforts so as to cover vital areas which at present are without adequate, competent cover. Action at this time to provide the basis for adequate, efficient coverage of vital areas throughout the world for the collection of intelligence information by clandestine methods, is a necessity in the accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

2. After consideration of all evidence assembled, the Director of Central Intelligence concludes that:

a. The collection of certain types of foreign intelligence information by clandestine methods is a service of common concern which can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. An operating service should be established and directed by the Director of Central Intelligence, with the mission of performing those clandestine collecting tasks that can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. (Paragraphs 3 b and c of the President's letter of 22 January 1946.) Within this mission, the scope of the service's activities should be determined by

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the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the IAB. The service should perform, upon the request of a departmental collecting agency, any collecting task within the authorized scope of its activities. The service should distribute collected information to departmental collecting agencies which in turn should determine and accomplish internal departmental distribution.

b. The establishment of the central clandestine collecting service shall in no way relieve the Departments of their responsibilities to collect departmental intelligence information pursuant to paragraph 6 of the President's letter of 22 January 1946. The departmental collecting activities and those of the central clandestine intelligence information collection service should be coordinated pursuant to NIA Directive ____.

c. Budget provision should be made in the 1948 estimates of the several Departments concerned, to provide the adequate, efficient, world-wide coverage which the national security demands. The sum required for such expanded coverage should be determined by a committee composed of a fiscal officer representing the Director of Central Intelligence, the fiscal officer of the Department of State, the fiscal officer of the Military Intelligence Division, and the fiscal officer of the Chief of Naval Intelligence. Provision should be made to facilitate the use of these funds for the purpose indicated when and as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.

d. The Federal Bureau of Investigation facilities for and activities in the collection of foreign intelligence information by clandestine methods in the political, economic and financial fields in Central and South America and the Caribbean, should gradually be withdrawn and FBI operations by clandestine methods outside the United States should be restricted to the collection of only such foreign intelligence information as is necessary to perform its mission pertaining to the internal security of the Nation.

Discussions upon which the foregoing conclusions are based is contained in Enclosure "B" (Appendix "B" hereto).

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3. The enclosed draft N.I.A. Directive has been prepared to provide the means for carrying out the recommendations based upon the above conclusions. It has been unanimously concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board.

4. It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in Enclosure "A" (Appendix "A" hereto).

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